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This paper argues that anthropological demography has, for most part, imported rather 
than exported theory. However, the discipline has the potential to generate important 
rethinking of population, culture, and their interaction. After discussing the challenges 
that must be faced in developing new theoretical approaches in anthropological 
demography, the paper suggests a framework for research based on the related ideas of 
the “demographic conjuncture” and “construal.”   
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1. Introduction  
Anthropological demography is both an old discipline and a new one. It is old in the 
sense that our core intellectual project—that of integrative understanding of cultural 
practices and demographic rates—has been conducted in some form for nearly two 
centuries. Quetelet's analysis of marriage (1968 [1842]) or Durkheim's of suicide (1930) 
might rightly be called primeval exercises in anthropological demography, because they 
treat demographic phenomena as social facts with unique, social and cultural 
explanations. At the same time, our discipline is brand new. It was only in the 1990s 
that a series of monographs and edited volumes began to codify the emerging field (see 
especially Basu and Aaby 1998; Greenhalgh 1995; Kertzer and Fricke 1997), and a 
decade later, we anthropological demographers are still sufficiently rare to count 
ourselves among a vanguard of a sort. That is not to say that we have no intellectual 
history between Durkheim and the renaissance of the 1990s. Scholars including Blake 
(1961); Bledsoe (1980); Fortes (1970); Hammel (1990); Howell (1979); Kertzer (1993); 
Kreager (1982); Lee (1984); Lesthaeghe (1977); and Watkins (1990, 2000) continued to 
develop an integrative intellectual program. However, they remained relatively few. 
Today, by contrast, there is considerable interest in the intersection of cultural 
anthropology and demography. Papers and books published since the mid-1990s are 
dazzling in their number, diversity, and quality (examples include: Bledsoe 2002; 
Castle 1994, 2001; Clark et al. 1995; Delaunay 1994; Hill and Hurtado 1996; 
Lockwood 1995; Setel 1999; Schneider and Schneider 1996; Smith 2001, 2004). It is an 
exciting time to be an anthropological demographer. 
Given this effervescence of research and writing, what kinds of theory should we 
look to? The differences in models, methods and epistemologies between contemporary 
demography and cultural anthropology could hardly be starker. Whereas contemporary 
anthropology focuses largely on ideology, power, and phenomenological experience, 
demography in the last ten years has been dominated by the statistical analysis of 
variation within western populations. Whereas the largest innovations in anthropology 
have been theoretical, the major advances in demography have been in the domains of 
data and method. The most widely cited papers in the major cultural anthropology 
journals in the past ten years address issues such as globalization (Ferguson and Gupta 
2002; Tsing 2000), modernity and post-coloniality (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999; 
Mills 1997), citizenship (Ong 1996), and the politics of space (Escobar 1999; Moore 
1998)
2. In the major anglophone demography journals, by contrast, the most widely 
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cited papers concern the welfare of American children (e.g. Bianchi 2000; Bumpass et 
al. 1995) changing rates of marriage, divorce and cohabitation (Bumpass and Lu 2000; 
Smock and Manning 1997); mortality differentials (Hummer et al. 1999; Smith and 
Kington 1997), fertility decline (Mason 1997; Bongaarts and Watkins 1996), and 
methodology (Bongaarts and Feeney 1998)
3. In this sense, it would seem to be a very 
difficult moment to be an anthropological demographer, because the two fields are so 
distant from each other. 
Despite the distance between the contemporary practice of cultural anthropology 
and demography, the possibilities for mutually productive intellectual exchange are 
enormous. Demographic rates are true “social facts,” in the sense intended by Durkheim 
(1962), which offer a compelling way to think about the relationship between the 
individual and the collective, about agency and structure, intentional action and 
conscience collective. Rates are, in Durkheim's language, “collective and coercive”, 
evoking certain forms of action from individuals without individuals necessarily being 
aware of the rates or explicitly orienting their action toward them (see Durkheim 1962: 
2-4)
4. It is profoundly ironic that actions experienced as voluntary and personal so 
consistently conform to population norms: no one jumps off a bridge because the 
number of suicides falls below the previous year's total; yet, suicide rates remain 
remarkably stable. No one bears an extra child to offset the thwarted fertility intentions 
of the infertile; yet, average ideal family size predicts population fertility rates even 
when individual-level concordance is low (see, for example, Quesnel-Vallee and 
Morgan 2000). Although rates structure the social environment, and thereby elicit 
specific types of action, across a wide variety of cases, this effect becomes particularly 
interesting in contexts where these rates become the object of explicit public discourse, 
setting up additional feedbacks between intentions, actions, awareness, and rates (see 
Krause 2005; Paxson 2004).  
It is not only at the level of rates, but also at the level of aggregate systems that 
cultural anthropology and formal demography can profit from mutual engagement. 
Populations are structured and structuring, as cultures are (compare Ryder 1964 with 
Levi-Strauss 1969 or Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940). They are systems with specific 
properties that inhere in their functioning as systems, regardless of the hopes or 
intentions of any individual. In this way, stable population theory and structural kinship 
analysis are near-perfect parallels: equilibrium models of the necessary implications of 
the structural characteristics of a system. It is here, perhaps, that philosophically 
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sophisticated anthropological demography has the most to offer demography as it is 
currently practiced, in the form of a better alternative to the methodological 
individualism of the sample survey and regression analysis showing the covariates of 
alternative demographic outcomes.  
But how are we to capitalize on this theoretical potential? What kinds of theory are 
appropriate in anthropological demography? What are the prospects for developing a 
generative anthropological demography, that advances the intellectual projects in the 
two disciplines in new directions? This paper will address these three questions. After 
briefly outlining the problems that a generative theoretical approach must address, I will 
propose a preliminary theoretical model for the intersection of cultural anthropology 
and demography. The theory is not fully developed, and I intend its description here as 
the starting-point for broader theoretical discussions across the field. Tersely, I will 
advocate a model of “demographic conjunctures” that integrates the social practice of 
Bourdieu (1977, 1984, 1998) and duality of structure of Sewell (1992, 2005) with 
classical population analysis (e.g. Halbwachs and Sauvy 2005; Leridon 1977). 
 
 
2. The missing theoretical revolution  
Stated tersely, there are three primary modes of research and writing in contemporary 
anthropological demography. The first links biological anthropology and demography, 
building on work in population biology and evolutionary ecology (see for example 
Jones 2004, 2006; Joseph 2004; Kaplan and Hill 1985; Leslie and Little 2003; McDade 
2003). A second body of research emerges out of science and technology studies and 
the Foucauldian analysis of demographic science as a core modality of biopower 
(Greenhalgh 1996; 2003; Kaufman and Morgan 2005; Rivkin-Fish 2003). Although this 
work addresses core theoretical issues in contemporary anthropology, it risks complete 
estrangement from demography. The third and largest corpus in contemporary 
anthropological demography draws on ethnographic methods and theories of culture to 
provide a richer understanding of demographic rates or, similarly, draws on 
demographic methods to confirm and strengthen the results of an ethnographic study 
(for example, Bernardi 2003; Bledsoe 2002; Castle 1995; Feldman-Savelsberg 1999; 
Greenhalgh 1994; Kanaaneh 2002; Lockwood 1995; Setel 1999). This is the tradition 
most salient to the present collection, the tradition that has received the most attention 
from demographers, and the one on which the remainder of the paper will focus.  
With some important exceptions, the anthropological demography to date has been 
consumptive rather than generative. What I mean by that is that most research has taken 
the insights or innovations of one of the two “parent” fields and applied them to the 
other, rather than becoming an original source of truly new social theory. I mean this Demographic Research: Volume 16, Article 1 
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descriptively rather than in an evaluative manner and include the majority of my own 
work in the description. This is almost certainly a normal phase in the development of 
an interdiscipline, perhaps even a phase that emerging fields leave and enter repeatedly 
as they negotiate an intellectual space for themselves. However, in order for 
anthropological demography to contribute in a meaningful way to the advancement of 
social science broadly, it will need to move from being consumptive of theory to 
generating and exporting theory. 
Happily, we are in an unusually strong position to make this transition, although it 
will likely be a rocky one. Intellectual innovation rests in part on pushing past the 
straight-jackets of taken-for-granted assumptions and common sense, and one of the 
most productive ways of doing that is through the mutual confrontation of profoundly 
incompatible perspectives. Thus, it is because cultural anthropology and formal 
demography are dissimilar in their views of intentional action, uncertainty, and 
aggregation that they make particularly appropriate foils for each other. For, although 
we share a sense of system and structure, we differ radically in our understandings of 
how that structure is formed and wherein it inheres, how it persists and how it should be 
studied. In order to advance the project of an integrated theoretical paradigm, we need 
to first explicitly address how and where we disagree. In making theory, there is a high 
cost to rapid but shallow consensus that leaves common sense unexamined. 
A simple example of the dangers of common sense comes from the use of 
ordinary-language terms in demographic writing. When we talk about fertility that is 
“unwanted,” “desired,” or “natural,” even when we know perfectly well the technical 
definitions of these terms, the ordinary meanings creep in to how we understand the 
phenomena at hand. When we describe certain forms of contraception as “modern” and 
others as “traditional” we invoke a whole range of resonances beyond the technical 
typology that we are citing. These resonances lead a double life: on the one hand, they 
give structure to our native common sense about the things we study. On the other 
hand, they offer the illusion of transparency to what are—sometimes at least—very 
nuanced and difficult concepts. The advantage of interdisciplinary encounters, then, lies 
in making common sense explicit, and therefore subject to reflection.  
Anthropological demography has the potential to revolutionize theory in both 
demography and anthropology by working back and forth across the divide between 
them. Analogies are important here: we need to think not of interdisciplinary “seams,” 
which suggest an unproblematic interface of two similar fabrics, but rather of 
interdisciplinary “fault lines,” emphasizing that the two sides are in contrary motion, so 
that in grinding against each-other, both faces are transformed. We do our most 
productive theoretical work within the fault line of disciplinary difference. The missing 
theoretical revolution in anthropological demography comes from our seeking to seam 
together our parent disciplines, rather than to examine their essential contradictions. Johnson-Hanks: What kind of theory for anthropological demography?  
6   http://www.demographic-research.org 
3. Key problems in developing theory for anthropological 
demography  
Despite the last ten years of vibrant new writing at the intersection of demography and 
anthropology, relatively little new theory has emerged. Indeed, the task is very difficult. 
We face at least two major analytic problems in the development of a theoretical 
paradigm for anthropological demography, each of which has generated a large 
theoretical literature in social science broadly. Happily, the fault line between culture 




3.1 Intention, meaning, and “choice”  
In Economy and Society, Weber argues that a sufficient analysis of social behavior—
such as getting married, giving birth, moving, or dying
5—requires “adequacy on the 
level of meaning” as well as mastery of the rates at which various forms of behavior 
occur (1978). Stated crudely, cultural anthropology has been strong on Weber's first 
requirement, while traditional demography has been strong on the second. And at first 
glance, there may appear to be no significant conflict here: let demographers explain 
what people do and cultural anthropologists explain why they do it. However, there is a 
profound conflict brewing just below the surface. What sense are we to make of those 
cases—and they are numerous—in which the apparent social motivations for behavior 
directly contradict statistical norms? For example, in Cameroon, abortion is illegal and 
considered sinful at the same time that it is widespread (see Johnson-Hanks 2002). In 
the United States, people disapprove of divorce and yet divorce is frequent. We 
advocate tolerance and yet often act to discriminate. We promote public education and 
send our children to private schools. How should we think about the relationship 
between social meanings and population rates? What does it mean for statistical 
regularities to conform to intelligible motivations? 
Within demography, most research relies on methodological individualism to solve 
these kinds of problems, reducing population statistics to the sum of individual 
decisions. Beginning with biological individuals, these models have the appeal of the 
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apparently natural and self-evident. These models rely on a variant of rational choice, 
treating the motivations of behavior as both causal and transparent, erasing cultural 
difference through a kind of demographic behavioralism, which finds its apogee in the 
concept of “revealed preference.” For example, in the domain I know best, standard 
approaches in fertility research claim that “fertility decline is a largely rational process” 
driven by “the desire for smaller families” (Bulatao 2001:11). In other words, fertility 
declines are a result of explicit reproductive intentions. These reproductive intentions 
are often assumed to be oriented toward total child numbers, essentially unchanging 
over the life course, and clearly articulable in an interview or survey context (e.g. 
Bongaarts 2001; Coale 1973; Henry 1961; Pritchett 1994)
6. Even papers that focus on 
the unmet need for contraception assume that women who do not want more children 
should be using contraception—that their preferences about child numbers should 
determine their reproductive behavior—and that their failure to contracept therefore 
provides evidence of social impediments or market constraints (e.g. Casterline, Sather 
and Haque 2001; Casterline and Sinding 2000). Quesnel-Vallee and Morgan (2004, 
based on Bongaarts 2001) offer a particularly cogent example of these standard models, 
in which: 
 
Final parity = intended parity * (F, U, M, S, C).       (1) 
 
Where F, U, M, S and C are distortions caused by sub-fecundity, unintended 
childbearing, finding partner, desired sex composition, and work-family conflict. That 
is, the model assumes an individual with clearly articulated, stable fertility intentions 
that are translated into fertility outcomes with some error, accounted for by F, U, M, S 
and C. 
Although these models often fit well at the aggregate level, their fit at the 
individual level is poor. Quesnel-Vallee and Morgan note that two-thirds of American 
respondents had misestimated their own future fertility (2003:512). Johnson-Hanks and 
Thayer (n.d.) find that in 17 African countries, stated intentions account for less than 
10% of the variation in fertility outcomes. Perhaps as important, standard models 
correspond weakly or not at all to individuals' own descriptions of their reproductive 
behavior. Recent work has shown that people do not necessarily have explicit plans of 
action in reference to reproduction; those plans may change before they are 
accomplished; the plans may be vague, underspecified, or relatively unimportant 
compared to other simultaneous plans; and actions with reproductive consequences also 
have other, even more important, functions (Bledsoe 2002; Caetano and Potter 2004; 
Fisher 2000; Fisher and Szreter 2003). In addition, people must collaborate with others 
                                                        
6 Although not explicit in the quote from Bulatao, much of this literature further assumes that fertility 
limitation occurs only through parity-specific control within marriage. Johnson-Hanks: What kind of theory for anthropological demography?  
8   http://www.demographic-research.org 
in the relevant actions (Andro and Hertrich 2001; Dodoo 1998); and even when people 
have clear intentions, biology often thwarts their achievement. 
All of these errors, complications, and forms of ambiguity are taken as the baseline 
in contemporary cultural anthropology. Indeed, in most of anthropology the issue is not 
to what degree social actors are able to effectively translate their fixed intentions into 
concrete action, but rather the processes of subject formation that inculcate people with 
certain kinds of aspirations, habits and intentions in the first place (see e.g. Foucault 
1990, 1997; Keane 1997; Mahmood 2005). Instead of treating action as the 
consequence of a set of relatively universal kinds of intentional projects, contemporary 
cultural anthropologists have explored how specific historical and cultural conditions 
influence not only what people intend, but more profoundly whether their action is 
“intentional” or “rationalized” at all. The basic insight in this literature is that 
personhood and identity are cultural products: cultures are not built up out of an 
aggregation of independent actors with fixed aspirations or ways of viewing the world. 
Rather, what people hope for—and even how they hope— is a consequence of cultural 
entrainment (see Miyazaki 2004). In this perspective, there is no use in thinking about 
intentions, goals, or choices without considering the social processes through which the 
categories of intention and choice are formed. 
The conflict here between demographic and ethnographic ways of reasoning about 
human action is radical and unavoidable. The two models propose entirely opposite 
starting places for analysis; each treats as derivative that which the other considers 
foundational. Are intentions the basis of society or its product? Is choice a universal 
human activity or a historically particular invention of modernity? Clearly here, a 
anthropological demography that seeks to combine the insights of the two fields 
without working through their contradictions will remain theoretically muddled. By 
contrast, working at the fault line may produce new readings both of intentions and of 
their conditions of possibility. For example, when Coale (1973) argued that fertility 
could only fall once child numbers entered into the “calculus of conscious choice,” he 
was reasoning from within a standard demographic logic. However, if we rethink his 
analysis against the ethnographic literature on subject formation, we may begin to 
develop a different perspective. The move to thinking about child numbers in an 
abstract and atemporal manner may indeed mark a radical social transformation. The 
idea that “I would like six children” relies on the same kind of synoptic illusion that 
Bourdieu addresses in his discussion of the Kabyle calendar (1977). He argues that “a 
calendar substitutes a linear, homogenous, continuous time for practical time, which is 
made up of incommensurable islands of duration, each with its own rhythm” 
(1977:104). At the point in history when people began to ask themselves how many 
children that wanted to have had by the end of their reproductive lives, they began to 
think about life and their life projects in a radically new way. This new way erases the Demographic Research: Volume 16, Article 1 
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process of child-having, collapses into a single moment the “incommensurable islands 
of duration” of the birth of the first child, conception of the second, weaning of the 
third, and so on. Coale’s concept of the “calculus of conscious choice” is given a 
different interpretation when put into dialog with ethnography and social theory. 
Working between statistical regularities and cultural meanings will be an essential 
component of new theoretical approaches in anthropological demography. 
 
 
3.2 Boundaries and things  
Just as the relationship between the individual and the aggregate poses a basic problem 
in socio-demographic analysis, so too do the boundaries of aggregates. By definition, 
when we calculate demographic rates for specific populations—Californians, African 
Americans, immigrants, or Catholics—we are making an implicit claim that this 
aggregation is socially or demographically meaningful. That is, we are making a claim 
about boundaries. Of course, we could calculate rates for either idiosyncratic or highly 
diverse populations, but our interpretative models presume that our populations are both 
“natural” and relatively coherent. A paper that presented mortality rates by zodiac sign 
rather than age would be considered inapt, because we know that age matters for 
mortality in a way that zodiac sign does not. Similarly, a geographic analysis of fertility 
relying on gerrymandered boundaries would rightly receive little scholarly attention. 
Intuitively, population rates should be calculated for “real” populations, that is, for 
populations that have some relevance external to our demographic estimates. 
But what makes a population “real”? What are its boundaries? How can a 
population be both systematic and open? These same problems apply to the other 
aggregates that matter to anthropological demography, namely culture and society. For 
nearly a century, anthropology has struggled over the problem of cultural borders, 
puzzling through the partial association of different aspects of cultural practice, and 
through the even more partial associations of culture with race and language (see Boas 
1938). In anthropology since the early 1980s, we have increasingly come to see culture 
as incoherent, contradictory, and lacking clear boundaries. As transnational flows of 
commodities, people, and symbols increase, so do references to cultural pastiche, 
simulacra, and fragmentation (Baudriallard 1988; Gupta and Ferguson 1992; Jameson 
1991; Kearney 1995). This movement has been a significant intellectual advance, 
making possible the exploration of questions that were previously precluded by 
structural and functional holisms. Yet, the resonance chambers of culture—in which a 
gesture reflects gender relations, which reflect myth, which reflects architecture—have 
not gone away. Cultural production can be polyvalent and innovative, but it cannot be 
completely unmoored from local practices and modes of meaning-making. Johnson-Hanks: What kind of theory for anthropological demography?  
10   http://www.demographic-research.org 
Anthropology profoundly needs an analytic language that makes room for both 
contradiction and coherence, seeing social reproduction neither as mere simulacrum nor 
as the inevitable product of a cultural grammar. A core theoretical contribution of 
anthropological demography may be to the development of this analytic language. 
One solution to the boundary problem is an ecological one: an ecological system 
clearly behaves as an interrelated whole without having clearly definable borders. 
Resources, stressors and organisms can fluidly move between ecosystems, while the 
structural unity of the whole remains. This analogy works better for the analysis of 
culture and society than of population, if only because classic demographic methods 
require more fixity in membership (see the discussion of migration in Ryder 1964). 
Bledsoe and her co-authors (n.d.) are beginning to develop a model of demographic 
events that begins with the problem of partial, sporadic, and even partially strategic 
membership in the various populations under study, treating the processes of (self-) 
selection into and out of differential risk as part of the demographic material. 
Profoundly innovative, this approach demonstrates the kind of theoretical advance that 
comes from working in the fault lines. 
An alternative to the ecological view of systems and boundaries is that proposed 
by sociologist Andrew Abbott. Abbott argues that boundaries are both conceptually and 
temporally prior to the units that they encapsulate and differentiate (1995). Instead of 
worrying about the boundaries of things, he proposes, we should ask how things are 
produced by their boundaries. The consequences for anthropological demography are 
profound. If demographic units—that is, populations—are the products of the perceived 
and performed differences between them, then we need truly new kinds of explanations 
for those differences. For example, we cannot treat “culture” as an unproblematic 
explanation for demographic differences, as intimated by the publications of the 
Princeton project (e.g. Knodel 1974; Lesthaeghe 1977; Livi-Bacci 1971), because the 
cultural units are themselves under construction. This does not mean that cultural 
differences are not associated with demographic rates—clearly they are—but rather that 
anthropological demography must attend to the reciprocal effects of rates and practices 
and of their consequences for individuating populations as socially identifiable units. 
In this way, Abbott's analysis of things and boundaries unites the problems of 
aggregates with the problem of intentional action. In both cases, what seemed fixed and 
foundational is argued to be uncertain and derivative. In both cases, what was taken as 
the beginning of analysis is now thrown open to be, itself, reanalyzed. We cannot take 
our objects for granted. For, as Abbott argues, “[s]ocial theories that presume given, 
fixed entities—rational choice being the obvious current example—always fall apart 
over the problem of explaining change in those entities, a problem rational choice 
handles by ultimately falling back on biological individuals, whom it presumes to have 
a static, given character” (Abbott 2001:263). Indeed, as we have seen, most existing Demographic Research: Volume 16, Article 1 
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fertility theories rely on some variant of rational choice, assuming that women or 
couples select the number of children that they intend to have by optimizing some 
utility function, and then use contraception, abortion, or infertility services as necessary 
to achieve that intended outcome. But reproductive action is rarely that abstract, and 
reproductive actors are never that simple. Many of the factors relevant to fertility 
behavior are overwhelmingly concrete, local, and temporally specific: intimacy with 
this partner, the convenience of this contraceptive method, or the difficulty of getting 
maternity leave this academic year matter as much or more as total child numbers. That 
is, we cannot assume a single, coherent rationality, for social actors are as much cultural 
products as they are the producers of events. At the same time, we need to attend to 
processes through which persons are categorized into or out of specific populations. 
These processes may be social or autobiographical, as the vast literature on selection 
points out. But they may also be implicit claims in a scientific model. Where we draw 
our boundaries and how we define our populations as “things” matter directly for our 
results and their interpretation. The problems of aggregation and meaning-making are 




4. Toward a theory of demographic conjunctures  
I have argued that anthropological demography has not, for the most part, as yet 
realized its extraordinary potential to reconfigure social theory. Although demographic 
rates are social facts of the most compelling kind, although “culture” and “population” 
offer contrasting concepts of social structure, and although the theoretical problems of 
boundaries, things, and intentional action are posed with striking clarity in the material 
of anthropological demography, most of the field remains theoretically derivative. In 
this section, I propose one kind of theoretical framework for the field, in order to launch 
debate and discussion. This theoretical framework is still incompletely developed, and I 
explain it here as much to incite debate as to persuade. Concretely, I propose that we 
focus on the fact that demographic rates are events divided by exposure to the risk of 
events, and therefore that we model the social conjunctures in which events occur. I will 
argue that rates should be seen as the product of the distribution of conjunctures (that is, 
specific, local contexts of action) and the culturally-configured processes of construal, 
through which actors make sense of, and engage with, those conjunctures. 
Before explaining this model, it may be helpful to contrast the basic approach I 
take here with that of quantitative microsociology and what has been called “social 
demography” in the United States. Work in these traditions has made important 
contributions to knowledge, and the contrast here serves to clarify my theoretical Johnson-Hanks: What kind of theory for anthropological demography?  
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approach, rather than to denigrate theirs. In particular, I use social demography as a 
comparison because it represents the primary, and in many ways ascendant, alternative 
to anthropological demography. The classic methods of social demography are the 
nationally representative sample survey and regression analysis using individuals as the 
units of analysis, posing research questions such as “is there an association between 
parental divorce and high school success, and is that association altered by income, 
gender, race, or birthweight?” That is, differences in outcomes are attributed to 
characteristics of individuals, some of which may be time-varying, but which are 
generally treated as independent of context
7. The core of the analysis is to distinguish 
traits that are directly associated with one another, as opposed to those whose 
association is the result of selection. The problems with this approach, in my view, are 
twofold. The first problem is interpretive. In order to explain why gender inflects the 
effect of divorce on high school success, or why Catholic religion used to matter for 
fertility but does not any more, the analyst must rely on information about social 
meanings that are external to the formal model, and therefore not tested by it. Papers 
can include exquisite mathematics but incoherent explanations of their results. The 
second problem is theoretical. If we are interested in population rates, we are interested 
in events and exposure, not individual-level traits. Traits may be associated with the 
probability of different events, but only indirectly, that is, through the kinds of actions 
or interactions that they make probable. In a direct sense, events are the outcomes of 
historical conjunctures. Death may come from a car accident or heart attack; pregnancy 
from a contraceptive failure or unexpected act of intercourse. The probability of a heart 
attack or contraceptive failure may, in turn, be associated with individual 
characteristics, but only in the sense that they constitute part of the background context 
in which the conjuncture of the event occurs. In his discussion of causes, Hume 
(2000:87) asks whether the fact that dice do not change shape, alter the number of pips 
on their sides, or smash to pieces when they hit the ground should be counted among 
the causes of having a certain sum come up on a specific roll. Here, Hume is asking 
about the relevance of the dice's traits for the outcome. Like human traits, these are part 
of the context in which a specific outcome may arise. But to understand the outcome 
itself, we require a theory of processes and events. 
A theory of demographic conjunctures focuses on events in context. It begins with 
the premise that demographic events are the products of social action, which occurs 
through the interplay of social structure and contingency. We can do little to directly 
model contingency, or the randomness of historical specificity
8. Rather, the theory of 
                                                        
7 The literature on multi-level effects represents a partial exception to this generalization. Still, however, the 
units of analysis are individuals and their traits, rather than situations per se. 
8 But see Bledsoe 2002; Johnson-Hanks 2004, 2005; Wagner-Pacifici 2000 for discussions of the centrality of 
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demographic conjunctures focuses on social structure and its instantiation in specific 
interactive contexts. To develop this model, I draw on two sources: first, theories of 
practice, including Bourdieu (1984, 1998), Sewell (1992, 2005) and others (de Certeau 
1984; Giddens 1979, 1984; Sahlins 1985); and second, the classical demography of 
vital events, in which birth and death rates are the products of life circumstances, rather 
than the traits of individuals (for example, Halbwachs 1960; Leridon 1977; Ryder 1978; 
Halbwachs and Sauvy 2005). When we calculate birth rates separately for the married 
and the unmarried, rather than including a marital status variable in a regression model, 
we are explicitly claiming that marriage constitutes a key factor of the social context 
relevant for childbearing. In specific times and places, that claim may be more or less 
empirically true, but it is always analytically clear and theoretically coherent. 
 
 
4.1 Conjunctures  
Abstracting from the slightly different uses in Bourdieu (1984), Sewell (2005), and 
others, I use the term “conjuncture” to refer to the full set of conditions relevant to the 
ongoing flow of action at a given time. “Conjunctures” are short-term configurations of 
context, the historically specific situations in which structure is mobilized and social 
action takes place (see Sewell 2005:220-224). Demographic conjunctures are highly 
structured and entail elements from a number of life domains—household structure, 
opportunities for advancement at work, the kinds of contraception available, and the 
recent reproductive events of friends—and they involve multiple time frames. Although 
modeled as synchronic structures, conjunctures are in constant flux. The boundary of 
the conjuncture is not sharply delineated, but characterized by the concept of 
“relevance” or “context” (see Sperber and Wilson 1986; Hanks 2006). Culture functions 
to make certain structural elements commonly relevant (for example, most Americans 
would consider finances salient to reproductive action); other structural elements may 
become relevant in specific contexts (for example, a would-be mother's health 
condition).  
I use the concept of conjuncture rather than the more general idea of “context” in 
order to emphasize two things. First, for some specific action, only certain elements of 
context will be relevant: which elements of context matter and how those elements are 
related both constitute important parts of the explanatory story. Second, part of what is 
compelling and surprising about the conjunctures of social life is what they bring 
together (that is, conjoin). Decisions about child timing are notoriously dependent on 
work and cross-country moves may hinge on a child finishing high school: 
“conjuncture” nicely captures the fact that the specific configurations of context in 
which action occurs are striking juxtapositions of different life domains. Is work the Johnson-Hanks: What kind of theory for anthropological demography?  
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context for reproduction? Or reproduction the context for work? Thinking instead about 
“conjunctures,” when work and reproductive trajectories become mutually salient and 
their futures contested, gets us out of that kind of chicken- and egg problem. 
Most of the time, conjunctures are mundane, their changes gradual. Occasionally, 
however, structural elements converge that dramatically reconfigure the kinds of futures 
that are possible or even desirable. An unintended pregnancy, health emergency or 
sudden job loss may instigate a time of uncertainty and reevaluation of all major life 
domains. I have called these durations “vital conjunctures” (Johnson-Hanks 2006). The 
current theoretical work extends the vital conjunctures approach to mundane 
conjunctures, that is, to the influence of ordinary, common changes in life 
circumstances on demographic practice. 
 
 
4.2 Construal  
The second component of this model is the actor's interpretation of, and engagement 
with, the conjuncture in the form of demographically relevant action. In fertility studies, 
these are obvious: taking time off work to get an IUD fitted or removed, setting up a 
routine to remember your birth control pills, getting treatment for endometriosis, timing 
intercourse, or interrupting it to get a condom are all reproductively relevant actions, 
nested in context. I use the term “construals,” borrowed from the literature in social 
psychology and linguistic anthropology, to refer to these actions because they interpret 
the complex set of relevant structural elements into a concrete behavioral stance. This 
process of intuitively “reading” a situation is generally called construal in neighboring 
social sciences (see Keltner, Nisbett, and Gilovitch 2005).  
The basic insight behind a theory of construal is that social actors can neither 
experience nor respond to the world except through some set of schemas that, like the 
cognitive processing necessary for vision, interpret an unordered array of dark and light 
into trees, vistas and faces. That is, our access to the world is necessarily mediated by 
eyes and brains, and these organs apprehend through appraisal, evaluation, and 
classification. We do not choose the schemas through which we interpret our 
surroundings, and can step outside them only with extraordinary difficulty. Try to listen 
to people speaking a language you know and hear only the pitch, tone, and volume—
not the meaning of the words. It is almost impossible, as it is almost impossible to 
interpret your interlocutor's speech without interpreting his actions as “promising,” 
“lying,”  “gossiping,” or “negotiating.” Schemas are unavoidable components of 
ordinary human engagement with the world. This inescapability of schemas applies to 
conjunctures as well: social actors must “read” the short-term configurations of context 
through existing categories and values. Social actors draw on both shared, cultural Demographic Research: Volume 16, Article 1 
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frameworks and individual predilections in making construals, which may be more or 
less conscious, more or less consistent, and more or less effective. In every case, 
however, the construal of a conjuncture motivates specific forms of demographically-
relevant action. Conjunctures and construals, rather than traits, are therefore the 
appropriate proximal framework for understanding  the distribution of vital events.  
Although we could theorize each individual construal as a decision, there are two 
reasons not to do so. First, most construals merely support an existing one: each day 
that you take a birth control pill is not really a choice to contracept, but more like the 
absence of a choice to stop. From a social or phenomenological perspective, habit or 
“creeping non-choice” differs significantly from repeated decisions. More importantly, 
construals may entail or imply decisions, but they are not necessarily decisions 
themselves, any more than gestalt-interpreting an unlit, abandoned parking lot as 
“dangerous” is a decision. Construals are interpretations of context; at their most 
iconographic, they are so routinized and normalized that they never surface as mental 
schemas, let alone as “decisions.” 
 
 
4.3 The structure of conjunctures and construals   
In a model of demographic conjunctures, rates are the product of the distribution of 
conjunctures and the processes of construal. But this leaves several questions open: 
What are the sources of conjunctures and construal? How are they organized? And how 
do they work? Sahlins (1985) explores the difference between thinking about a 
conjuncture of structures and about the structure of the conjuncture. That distinction is 
not important here, but the inevitable association between conjunctures and structure to 
which he points is indeed very important. A theory of demographic conjunctures is 
fundamentally about the relationship between vital rates, social structure, and subject 
formation. And the locus of their interaction is the contingent, temporary, eventful 
conjuncture.  
For Sewell (1992, 2005), social structure is the continual product of the interplay 
of resources and schemas. For Bourdieu (1977, 1984), structure lies in the mutual 
alignment of habitus and field. For both theorists, however, social actors’ inclinations, 
habits, or intuitions are produced out of their daily experiences in social worlds where 
authority and capital are unequally distributed. And that distribution, along with the 
ideology that legitimates it, is in turn reproduced by the actions of those persons whose 
inclinations it has formed. That is, we behave as we do not because we have considered 
all the alternatives and selected this one as maximizing our utility, but rather because 
we are habituated or predisposed to act in this way. These predispositions are the 
product of our past experiences, which took place in a social world of people who Johnson-Hanks: What kind of theory for anthropological demography?  
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themselves had similarly structured predispositions. The consequences of our acting 
based on these predispositions are both to recreate the world to which our 
predispositions are attuned and to model them for subsequent generations of social 
actors. While a full analysis of the relationship between Sewell's duality of structure 
and Bourdieu's theory of practice is beyond the scope of this paper, these basic points of 
agreement are critical building blocks to a theory of demographic conjunctures. 
Conjunctures are the short-term configurations of social structure—”situations,” if 
you will—that are the proximal context for vital events. Think about the situation of a 
young, unmarried man living in a small town in what was once East Germany. Perhaps 
he finds himself unemployed and living with his parents, actively involved in a small 
and zealous church, and perhaps he gets his girlfriend pregnant. In broad strokes, we 
have here a conjuncture. Whether conjunctures of this kind are rare or common depends 
on social structure, including for example the labor and housing markets, patterns of 
religious engagement, the availability of contraception and cultural practices around its 
use. How he and his close consociates construe the conjuncture is also a product of 
social structure, refracted through the habits of thought and interpretation that he has 
acquired as a member of this society. And the outcome of his construal—whether he 
offers to marry the girl, tries to persuade her to abort the pregnancy, or leaves town to 
avoid responsibility—is at once the product of his construal of the conjuncture, and an 
element in the reinforcement or partial transformation of the social structures that 
brought it about. 
We can see the importance of social structure for conjunctures and construal, and 
therefore for vital events, in comparing the improbable and fictional conjuncture 
described above to a very similar, but real event, that occurred in the United States. In 
2005, Kenisha was still in school, unmarried, evangelical Christian, and pregnant. She 
felt conflicted because several schemas seemed to apply in her situation, but these 
schemas suggested mutually exclusive courses of action. Was the pregnancy a trial that 
God had given her? The consequences of sin? An indication that she had been in school 
long enough? The result of bad luck that could be corrected with a legal medical 
procedure? Each construal suggested a distinct course of action. The resolution came a 
few weeks later, through the intervention of her boyfriend's mother. He had been 
unready to marry Kenisha because he was “waiting for a sign from God” that she was 
the one. His mother argued that the pregnancy itself was a sign that they were intended 
to marry: God loved and wanted this child enough to call him into the world contrary to 
mere human will, as Kenisha had gotten pregnant while using contraception. They did 
indeed marry. 
This turn of affairs both reinforced and partially transformed the social structure of 
Kenisha's community. Her future mother-in-law used a schema available throughout 
their social community to construe the conjuncture. Divine intervention in human life Demographic Research: Volume 16, Article 1 
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was not a new idea. What she did was to interpret this specific event as an example of 
that broader category. Her construal was successful because the situation fit the reading 
well enough to be convincing, and because ancillary schemas—such as God's love of 
children—could be read as supporting her construal. Note that there is nothing 
inevitable about this interpretation of the situation. Construal is sometimes highly 
contingent, as multiple schemas could apply. Before the working through of the 
conjuncture, its outcome is frankly uncertain. Through this construal, the boyfriend's 
mother effected two transformations of structure. First, this innovative application of 
the schema of divine intervention partly transformed the schema itself. Within their 
entourage, perhaps within their church, future unintended pregnancies will be more 
readily construed in this way. 
Second, this construal resulted in actions that lead to changes in the distribution of 
resources, such as by generating support in the community for the pregnancy. From a 
wayward schoolgirl, Kenisha became the bearer of a divinely ordained pregnancy, and 
her evangelical brethren offered her material and emotional support that would not have 
otherwise been forthcoming. Thus, we see in this case how mobilizing structure to 
navigate a specific conjuncture both reinforces aspects of that structure at the same time 
as it makes incremental changes to it. Structural reproduction and change occur 
together. We also see how concrete events are not only the basis of calculating 
demographic rates, but are also the pivots for subject formation, social structure and 
social change. Vital events are the direct consequences of specific conjunctures and 
construals; vital rates are the precipitate of the distribution of conjunctures and the 
processes of construal. We can analytically separate vital events, social structure, and 




5. Conclusion  
This paper has discussed the present state and possible future of anthropological 
demography. I have argued that our discipline has extraordinary potential for theoretical 
innovation, but that this potential has gone largely undeveloped. Working in the fault 
line between the social science discipline that is the most quantitatively exacting and 
the one that is most experientially rich, anthropological demography has exceptional 
material for rethinking social action and its consequences. Developing the idea of the 
demographic conjuncture, I have tried to offer one possible theoretical frame for our 
work. In contrast to the trait-based models and assumption of universal rationality that 
have defined so much of social demography, I have proposed that we should focus on 
the social contexts of events. A theory of demographic conjunctures begins with Johnson-Hanks: What kind of theory for anthropological demography?  
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situations and their interpretation—with conjunctures and construal—to examine the 
social structures and kinds of persons that produce them and which they, in turn, 
partially reproduce. 
The theory of demographic conjunctures is, at present, imperfect and incomplete. I 
propose it here in order to inspire debate. We have often agreed too easily, ignoring 
profound theoretical differences in order to get on with the work of description. But the 
differences matter, and the debate is worthwhile. If anthropological demography is to 
become an important locus of theoretical innovation, we have to confront our 
intellectual disagreements. Working in a fault line, we can take advantage of the 
contrary motion in demography and anthropology to reconfigure the surfaces of both 
fields. Otherwise, we will be crushed between them. 
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